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The Formation and Early Activities of the Council of Free 
Czechoslovakia  
   
1. Introduction 
The history of the Czechoslovak political exile after the Communist takeover  
in February 1948 has not been systematically studied. A brief account of the 
beginnings of the organization and the first difficulties of the Council of Free 
Czechoslovakia (Rada svobodného Československa) is provided in a monograph by 
Zdeněk Jirásek and Miloš Trapl.1 This pioneering publication is based on materials 
originating almost exclusively in Czech archives. A compilation of documents was 
assembled by Bohumír Bunža.2 It focuses primarily on Council declarations in the 
organization’s later years.  
 
A much more detailed description of the events leading to the formation of the Council 
and the first years of its existence was published by Bořivoj Čelovský.3 Čelovský 
worked with the documents of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia located at the 
Center for Exile Studies at Palacký University in Olomouc (Czech Republic), the 
archive of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Archives of 
Canada in Ottawa. The Council was also the subject of an article by Slavomír 
Michálek in 1999.4 In addition, the specific events surrounding the formation and 
activities of the Council can be found in the biographies of various participants, the 
most useful of which is Pavel Kosatík’s biography of Ferdinand Peroutka.5 Much 
useful information is also available in a detailed history of the Czechoslovak Social 
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Democratic Party in exile written by Radomír Luža.6 Views on exile politics from 
outside the mainstream can be found in a collection of articles by Josef Kalvoda.7  
 
Political refugees from Czechoslovakia who were scattered throughout the world tried 
to organize along political party lines divided into two groups: the non-Communist 
parties of the National Front, which had held power in Czechoslovakia between 1945 
and 1948, and the pre-war parties forbidden after 1945. In the first group, the National 
Socialists (Národní socialisté) were the largest and best organized. The Social 
Democrats (Sociální demokraté) were less numerous, but made use of their contacts 
with the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. The smallest Czech party within the 
first group was the People’s Party (Lidovci). The Slovaks were organized in the 
Democratic Party and in a tiny Freedom Party. Of the second group, three pre-war 
parties, whose reestablishment had been forbidden after 1945, tried to reorganize in 
exile. The largest among them was the Agrarian Party, which was later renamed the 
Republican Party (Republikáni). Also there was the smaller National Democratic Party 
(Národní demokraté) and the smallest was the Smallholders (Živnostníci). There was 
little love lost between the parties of the National Front and the other three “civic” 
parties. The “civic” parties felt discriminated against by the parties of the National 
Front, whom they accused of collaborating with the Communists. In addition, there 
was a small number of existing émigré organizations, both Czechoslovak and Slovak, 
who had little sympathy for the new political exiles. The Slovak organizations tended 
to be openly separatist and their goal was the renewal of the wartime independent 
Slovak state. Sudeten German organizations in the American and British Occupation 
Zones of Germany did not help matters because the majority of refugees from 
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Czechoslovakia in 1948 were concentrated in German refugee camps where conflicts 
frequently arose.  
 
 The road to the formation of a united organ of democratic Czechoslovak exiles proved 
to be difficult. This author has assembled materials from British (National Archives in 
London, Churchill College Archives in Cambridge) and American archives (Hoover 
Institution at Stanford, Immigration History Research Center in Minneapolis, 
University of Indiana Archives in Indianapolis, New York Public Library) on the 
activities of Czechoslovak political exiles after 1948. This article summarizes and 
analyzes the efforts leading to the formation of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia 
and the first year of its activities. 
 
2. Formation of the council 
After the Communist takeover of the Czechoslovak government in February  
1948, a large group of non-Communist Czechoslovak politicians sought exile in the 
West. A large proportion of them left their homeland out of a justified fear of 
Communist persecution. In fact, some of the non-Communist politicians in 
Czechoslovakia had been arrested already in February 1948, but were released 
following the personal intervention of President Edvard Beneš. Most of those who 
escaped initially found refuge in the western zones of Germany, and others in Austria. 
As time progressed, significant groups of exiles formed in Britain, France, and the 
United States. Smaller groups formed in Belgium, Italy, and other countries as well. At 
first, most of the refugees were interned in various refugee camps where living 
conditions were very poor. Their situation improved somewhat in the summer months 
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of 1948 when the refugee camps were placed under the jurisdiction of the International 
Refugee Organization.8  
 
Prominent individuals such as former government members or parliamentary deputies 
were housed at the so-called Alaska House in Frankfurt. Among the early ones were 
National Socialists Hora, Čížek, Stránský, and Krajina; People’s Party deputy 
Ducháček; Judge Jaroslav Drábek and editor, Ivan Herben. Their first significant 
activity was initiating a meeting of the representatives of four parties (National 
Socialist, Social Democratic, Slovak Democratic, and People’s) in Paris followed by 
another meeting on 10 April in London. The main purpose was an agreement to form a 
central Czechoslovak organ in exile, which should help provide for a growing number 
of Czechoslovak refugees.9 Three National Socialist deputies, accompanied by the 
Minister of Defense in the wartime Czechoslovak Exile Government, visited Winston 
Churchill, who tried to arrange a presentation by them in the House of Commons.10 
But, the meeting at the House of Commons never took place. At that time, a Social 
Democrat, Blažej Vilím, used his access to the Labour government and tried to 
organize a meeting of thirty escaped Czechoslovak parliamentary deputies prior to the 
Czechoslovak elections scheduled for 30 May. It should be mentioned that he had to 
assure the British authorities that there was “no intention to set up any committees, 
least of all a government-in-exile.”11 Foreign Office official, Mayhew, added his own 
opinion: “My own view is that this is the “thin end of the wedge” and that if we do not 
intend to use Czech refugees for propaganda and intelligence purposes, we would not 
be wise to open our doors to these Czech MPs.” C.F.A. Warner, Mayhew’s colleague, 
agreed: “I think most of these MPs will drift on to America before they become out of 
date (and therefore valueless) and have become much of a nuisance here.”12 R.M.A. 
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Hankey at the Foreign Office recommended that the Czechoslovak MPs should be 
given the visas.13 The meeting of Czechoslovak parliament members was finally 
scheduled for 28 May 1948 at Caxton Hall in London. Prior to the meeting, the Czech 
delegation failed to obtain a reception with the Speaker of the British Parliament. The 
meeting adopted a two-page resolution deploring the Communist takeover of 25 
February and declared that, regardless of party, they would strive “with all our efforts 
in brotherly unity for the return of freedom and democracy to our country in the spirit 
of the humanitarian, democratic, and socialist principles of our president-liberator, 
T.G. Masaryk.”14 The role of these Czechoslovak politicians was difficult indeed 
because nobody seemed to care much about their predicament. A confidential appraisal 
of the meeting for the Foreign Office stated: “…having depended so long upon their 
leader, Dr. Beneš, and been deserted by him at the crucial moment, these 
Czechoslovak exile politicians are almost at a total loss as to where to go from here. 
There is no leader of inspiration among them, at least for the moment.”15 
 
In the United States, early attempts to organize an exile movement were undertaken by 
diplomats rather than politicians, because the latter were more limited in number. The 
first meeting, which took place on 14 June 1948 in New York, consisted of eight 
people, seven of whom were Slovaks.16  They issued a public declaration and informed 
the American authorities of their intention to organize a central organ of Czechoslovak 
resistance, namely the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.17 A press conference ensued 
on 29 June 1948, during which a memorandum was presented by Dr. Štefan Osuský, a 
major rival of Beneš’s during the Second World War. The most important meeting 
took place on 17-18 July in New York. The British Foreign Office, which was closely 
monitoring the situation, concluded that “the Preparatory Committee of the Council of 
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Free Czechoslovakia was composed of fairly harmless individuals, except for Dr. 
Osuský.”18 
 
Yet another center of Czechoslovak exile activity was established in Paris. This 
consisted of mainly Agrarians, National Democrats, and Smallholders (the three 
parties not reinstated in Czechoslovakia after the 1945 liberation). The People’s Party 
had its representatives there as well and the National Socialist leader, Hubert Ripka, 
also joined the group.  
 
Both the summer and autumn months of 1948 witnessed frantic activities in both 
London and Paris. The representatives of individual parties tried to form various 
coalitions with other parties while, at the same time, excluding others.19  
 
On 17 September 1948, the British authorities concluded that an agreement 
had been reached among all political parties to form the Council of Free 
Czechoslovakia, which would include representatives of all parties of the “National 
Front” as well as the Republicans, as the Agrarians now were called.20  
 
The British could not have been more mistaken. The negotiations would last 
for a long time yet. The working charter document stated that the future members 
would all be government ministers and parliamentary deputies representing all 
Czechoslovak political parties since 1 January 1935. The British desk officer at the 
Foreign Office considered this unfortunate. “For the Communists will make much 
good propaganda if the old reactionary parties are deliberately revived by the 
émigrés.”21 
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A regional meeting took place in Paris in early January with little unity  
among the parties.22 Rudolf Kopecký, a National Democrat who worked at the BBC in 
London summarized his unhappiness as follows:  
 
 
I think that our entire group still lives in domestic conditions and that 
they are awarding ministerial posts instead of admitting that now it is 
necessary to work together to ensure the possibility of awarding such 
posts in the future…This reminds me of another mistake on the part of 
the Czechoslovak exiles. I will use the metaphor of sports terminology. 
The majority of our politicians think that our struggle is a sprint, 
whereas I declare that it is a marathon. If I am wrong, then I will arrive 
at the finish line late. But, if our politicians are wrong, and perhaps they 
see that they are, they will never reach the finish line. To speculate that 
war is imminent and that we will return home leads us to erroneous 
conclusions, which are the reasons for our failure to unite…The task of 
the politician is to assure for his nation peace, tranquility, a satisfying 
way of life, and prosperity. We know that, to give this to our people, we 
have to liberate our country. Therefore, no matter what pacifists we are, 
we are not afraid of war. Put yourself in the position of a British or 
American minister. Does he need to assure this for his nation? You may 
call me a pessimist, but I am not. Life has taught me. I liken everything 
that took place in Paris to playing with toy soldiers.23   
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The final meeting of the Preparatory Committee was called for 11 February 
1949. It took place at All Souls Unitarian Church in Washington, D.C. and resulted in 
an agreement ten days later to form the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The 
formation was announced on 25 February 1949 in a Declaration sent to thirty-nine 
governments. Twenty-one of them, including the United States, United Kingdom, and 
France, acknowledged the notification in writing.24  
 
The Declaration is an impressive document written by a prominent Czech journalist 
and writer, Ferdinand Peroutka. Its conclusion stated:  
 
 
Even if the Communist regime rages with madness, please preserve 
spotless the character of the nation. Do not allow yourselves to be 
deceived so as not to be able to recognize what is freedom and what is 
tyranny, what is right and what is wrong. In your thinking, be free men. 
Educate your children to be honest citizens. Teach them, and you 
yourselves never forget, to distinguish between good and evil. If the 
character of the nation is preserved, everything else will be restored.25  
   
 
Petr Zenkl was elected chairman of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. Jozef Lettrich 
(Slovak) and Václav Majer were both elected vice-chairmen. The presidium consisted 
of twelve members and the executive committee had thirty. In addition, there was to be 
a consultative body consisting of about 100 members.26 Among exiles, reactions to the 
Council’s establishment were mixed.  
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The New York Times published a terse announcement on 26 February 1949. 
 
 
Yesterday, on the one-year anniversary of the Communist takeover in Prague, 
the newly formed Council of Free Czechoslovakia announced its determination 
to liberate its country from the yoke of Communist tyranny. 
 
 
The formation of a central organ of Czechoslovak exile resistance was an important 
event. The road to this goal, however, was complicated by controversy, striking 
disagreements between Czech and Slovak representatives respectively, and friction 
among the political parties. The domination of the Council by the parties of the post-
1945 National Front did not go unrecognized by other parties in exile. Future 
developments showed that these conflicts would be ignored only temporarily. It was 
significant, however, that the Czechoslovak exile was the first of Soviet-dominated 
European countries to form a central political body in exile.  
 
3. Early council activities   
By the end of 1950, the presidium of the Council had met thirty-seven times in  
New York or Washington. These meetings resulted in the adoption of a number of 
formal declarations on conditions in Czechoslovakia. Communist terror was deplored, 
especially the executions of General Heliodor Píka and Dr. Milada Horáková. The 
Council also protested Communist aggression in Korea. 
 
10 
 
From the outset, the preparatory committee had difficulties financing its activities. In 
March 1949, the situation improved when funds began arriving from “anonymous” 
donors, surrounded in secrecy. Some members of the Council were uncomfortable 
with the funding situation and began to question the source of the funds.27 
  
The money actually came from the United States Central Intelligence Agency and was 
later funneled through the “non-profit” organization known as the National Committee 
for a Free Europe. (NCFE) Some members were at this time receiving personal support 
ranging from between two hundred and four hundred dollars (at first called “stipends” 
and later “compensation”). In the summer of 1950, the NCFE asked the Council to 
present a budget proposal. Discussions concerning this took place at a meeting of the 
presidium on 16 July 1949.28 Although the proposed budget was 29,200 dollars per 
month, the NCFE initially agreed to provide 8,900 dollars per month.  
 
A Council report on its activities of November 1950 summarized the state of the 
Council as exceptionally satisfactory: “The Council finds understanding and 
sympathies everywhere…The relationship to the American representatives is based on 
close cooperation with the NCFE. This collaboration is driven by the unity of goals of 
both organizations…”29 The report also stated the following about Radio Free Europe 
(RFE): “Even before the broadcasts of RFE began in July 1950, the Council expressed 
its interest in establishing close collaboration with RFE…”30 Indeed, participation in 
Radio Free Europe’s activities probably represented the most effective aspect of the 
Council’s anti-Communist activities.  
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Regional committees of the Council were established in London and in Paris. Their 
membership was declining because many members were in the process of moving to 
North America. In London, vice-chairman of the Council, Václav Majer, sent a list of 
the London committee’s membership to the Foreign Office on 1 April 1949, and the 
Foreign Office duly noted that of the fourteen members, three had already moved to 
Canada or the United States.31 Requests for financial support from the British were 
denied. 
 
In Paris, the chairman of the local board, Dr. Hubert Ripka, was voted out on 23 
January 1950. The Washington-based presidium of the Council refused to 
acknowledge this result.32 The split in the Paris regional committee should have been a 
harbinger of things to come in Washington.   
 
In October 1950, a rift developed between the Council’s chairman, Petr Zenkl,  
and his first deputy, Dr. Jozef Lettrich, who happened to be a Slovak. A meeting of the 
executive committee was called for 6 January 1951.33 On 5 January 1951, the Council 
received an ultimatum from the chairman of the NCFE, C.D. Jackson.34 It concluded:  
 
 
…It is honest to announce to you, your colleagues, and legally empowered 
functionaries, that the NCFE will fundamentally reexamine its relationship with 
the Council of Free Czechoslovakia in light of the results accomplished at this 
meeting.35  
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The meeting of the Council was affected by Jackson’s ultimatum. Lasting two weeks, 
the meeting represented a picture of disunity and personal invectives. The ultimate 
catastrophe was brought about by a discussion of the terms of office that was rejected 
by the National Socialists, who abruptly left the meeting. The executive committee 
split into two groups. The opinion of the majority was presented by Ferdinand 
Peroutka, who killed any chances of the reelection of Zenkl as chairman. A minority 
group of thirteen dissenting members declared that the Council was dissolved and left 
the meeting. The majority group, however, continued the activities of the Council. The 
dissenters subsequently announced the formation of a new organization, the National 
Committee of Free Czechoslovakia with Petr Zenkl as its chairman.36 The majority 
(seventeen members) of the original executive committee empowered Peroutka to 
negotiate a meeting with Dolbeare and Jackson of the NCFE in order to set up a 
meeting with a duly elected delegation led by Václav Majer.  
 
Explanations for the breakup of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia by  
different participants in the events varied. The National Socialists were united, but 
Professor Stránský failed to provide valid reasons. Stránský categorically stated, 
however, that it was not on account of the issue of terms of office.37 A factual and 
unemotional description was provided by Miloslav Rechcígl, who blamed Zenkl and 
his supporters.38 The most interesting was the situation among the Social Democrats. 
Two of them sided with the Zenkl group and opposed the resolution of their own party. 
Senator Vojta Beneš justified his decision by expressing revulsion at “the execution of 
Zenkl” at the meeting by Ferdinand Peroutka.39  Beneš stated at the meeting: “If you 
want to execute someone, do not beat him so much before the execution…!”  He 
continued: “The attacks on Zenkl were so obscene that I withdrew my support for the 
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definitions of the terms of office; it changed into an instrument, the executioner’s axe.”   
Jan Žák tried to justify his vote in a letter to the party leadership.40 Bohumil Laušman, 
a prominent social democrat wrote to Professor Karel Maiwald of Cambridge 
University that it was a “comedy, but that one should cry.”41 
 
The breakup of the Council received sharp criticism from other members of the 
 Czechoslovak exile community. Pressure slowly mounted for the two groups to 
reconcile their differences and unite, but this did not happen in 1951. On the occasion 
of the opening of the Munich station of Radio Free Europe, the Council of Free 
Czechoslovakia together with several members of the National Committee of Free 
Czechoslovakia, including its chairman, Petr Zenkl, made a joint statement on 30 April 
1951.42  
 
An attempt to bring the two organizations together in May 1951 failed and their 
respective representatives continued their mutual accusations of pettiness and position-
seeking. On 26-27 January 1952, the two organizations formed a committee consisting 
of twenty-four members on the basis of an agreement that had been reached on 15 
January 1952.43 
 
The Council adopted statutes which based its organization along party lines and also 
allowed for a body of personalities unaffiliated with any political party. After difficult 
and stormy meetings, the Council was reunited. The chairman of the executive 
committee was Petr Zenkl, whereas the chairman of deputies was Štefan Osuský. The 
remaining fifteen years were marked by a continuing crisis and attempts to find 
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solutions. Yet, in spite of party rivalries and personal conflicts, the Council would play 
an important role in the fight against Communism.  
 
The most effective tactic in the fight against Communism was the participation of 
Council members in Radio Free Europe. Ferdinand Peroutka became the head of the 
Czechoslovak Section. Between 1 May 1951 and 25 December 1976, Peroutka wrote 
more than one thousand commentaries for listeners in Czechoslovakia. Most of these 
commentaries can be found in the archives of the Hoover Institution at Stanford. 
Except for the first year, the majority of these commentaries focused on international 
events and presented and defended the interests and policies of the United States. The 
Communist government in Czechoslovakia paid close attention to Peroutka’s activities 
and spent large resources on a program of systematic jamming of RFE broadcasts. 
Peroutka’s position at Radio Free Europe gave him extraordinary powers on the 
Council. He decided who would speak on the program to Czechoslovakia, which was 
not only important for exile politicians, but also provided honoraria. As program 
director, Peroutka especially valued a young and very talented journalist and People’s 
Party member, Pavel Tigrid. Tigrid was brilliant, but abrasive and soon had conflicts 
with some older socialist politicians. Peroutka thus fired Tigrid and replaced him with 
Socialist, Julius Firt. After overcoming some hardship, Tigrid began to publish the 
periodical Svědectví (Testimony) in Europe. Svědectví gained a wide circulation and 
succeeded in its goal to undermine systematically Communist policies. 
 
The Americans appreciated Peroutka’s talents and did not hesitate to use him in order 
to pressure the Council. Peroutka soon found out that the Americans, not he, controlled 
the Czechoslovak program of the BBC. The best example was the fate of his own piece 
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of work on former president, Edvard Beneš.44 The most striking was his change of tune 
with respect to the issue of the Sudeten Germans. The NCFE was very sensitive to this 
political group (Sudeten Germans), which was becoming politically influential in West 
Germany and very closely followed the RFE program. The Council’s program of 1952 
stated: “We consider the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia to be definitive. It 
was implemented on the basis of agreements among the American, British, and French 
governments and in accordance with the declarations of the Potsdam conference…”45 
The NCFE leadership was concerned about this statement and about the statement 
regarding the renewal of Czechoslovakia within its pre-Munich frontiers.46 The 
Council’s position on transfer gradually softened due to pressure exerted by the NCFE 
in spite of the fact that some Council leaders had been the moving force behind the 
Czechoslovak Exile Government’s transfer plans during the war. Along these lines, it 
is imperative to note that, at variance with the wishy-washy position of the NCFE in 
the 1950s, in the 1990s, the United States Government’s position on the issue of 
transfer was unequivocal and the transfer was defended as “…an historical fact based 
on the Potsdam conference and the United States is confident that no country wishes to 
call it into question.”47 
 
On 20 April 1953, Peroutka met with a representative of Dr. Rudolf Lodgman von 
Auen (leader of the revisionist Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft based in Munich) 
and stated: “I cannot imagine a permanent solution of matters without the return of the 
Germans.”48 Peroutka’s dialogue with representatives of Sudeten German 
organizations continued. In an interview with a German newspaper in New York, 
Peroutka stated: “My personal view is that the almost complete expulsion of the 
Sudeten Germans was a mistake. Moreover, what happened during the implementation 
16 
 
of it is a shame.”49This statement provoked a storm of protests, but Peroutka refused to 
stop. 
 
Also a major source of conflict among members of the Council was the relationship 
between the two main nationalities, namely the Czechs and Slovaks. This issue was 
never resolved satisfactorily and the post-Communist history of Czechoslovakia, 
which survived a mere three years after the return of democracy, demonstrates the 
depth of the problem, which ended in the division of Czechoslovakia into two 
countries on 1 January 1993. 
 
Another major activity of the Council was participation in various international bodies. 
The European Movement is worthy of mention, but the most important organization 
the Council took part in was the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN). 
ACEN was founded in the summer months of 1954 as a representative body of Central 
and East European countries under Communist and Soviet domination. These included 
Albania, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. 
Czechoslovak participation started with a bang. Dr. Štefan Osuský (the head of the 
first delegation) chaired the meeting of 22 October 1954. The program focused upon 
Soviet aggression toward and oppression of the “captive nations”, violations of peace 
treaties by Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and the forced militarization of captive 
nations. In addition, religious persecution in captive nations and forced labor behind 
the Iron Curtain were discussed.50 Czechoslovak participation received much publicity 
in the Czech and Slovak press in the West.51 Representatives from the Council 
presented a number of fundamental contributions to the deliberations of ACEN. 
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Unfortunately, as was the case with almost all other Council activities, its participation 
in ACEN soon deteriorated due to factionalism and personal rivalries.  
 
Already in 1956, problems arose with respect to the Czechoslovak delegation.52 The 
Council ultimately split and Czechoslovak representation in ACEN was awarded for a 
while to a new competing body called the “Committee for Free Czechoslovakia.” This 
organization adhered to the statutes of ACEN, which prohibited representatives from 
accepting the citizenship of other countries. Arguments between competing factions of 
Czechoslovak exiles may seem ridiculous today, but, at the time, they exerted a 
negative influence on the effectiveness and international standing of their cause.  
 
The archives are filled with documents attesting to an almost uninterrupted crisis in the 
Council of Free Czechoslovakia. It should be stressed that a number of members 
proposed remedial actions involving changing the statutes and bylaws of the Council, 
but to no avail. Among them, we should mention Miloslav Rechcígl, a pre-war 
parliamentary deputy of the Agrarian Party53, and Václav Hlavatý, a famous 
mathematician and former National Socialist MP.54 Above all, however, a great effort 
to resolve quarrels among Council members was made by representatives of the young 
generation of Czechoslovak exiles, who declared: “The basis of real leadership in exile 
has to be a program and not personal sympathies or antipathies. We wish that work 
was the only requirement for membership in the leadership.”55 On 29 March 1955, 
Peroutka informed Bernard Yarrow of the NCFE about the sorry shape of the Council 
and proposed corrective measures.56 Revealing is the letter of Julius Firt to Peroutka of 
22 September 1956:  
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I understand your disgust, but I think you cannot pull back and leave 
everything to these gangs. I think we would have to bite into the 
unpleasant, but important problem. The Council needs to be placed on 
an entirely new foundation and the old one needs to be put on some sort 
of reservation where the old stags are not hunted, but also cannot be 
allowed to cross the fence.57  
 
 
NCFE support for the Council came to an end in 1957.  
   
4. Conclusion 
A scathing criticism of the Council’s activities was presented by the editor of   
the exile periodical Skutečnost (Reality). In the final issue of Volume V, Jan Hanuš   
Hájek wrote:  
 
 
Among organizations striving to acquire the character of an exile 
government, the first place belongs to the Council of Free 
Czechoslovakia; it is composed on one hand of independent 
intellectuals belonging to the older generation and, on the other hand,-
and this is regrettably the majority-of escaped “people’s democratic” 
politicians who have always been incompetent in the field they selected 
as their career…The program of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia is, 
of course, the liberation of Czechoslovakia from Communism, etc. An 
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objective observation of the Council’s activities indicates that there is 
little more than empty phrases…58  
 
 
To be critical of the leadership of the post-1948 Czechoslovak exile today would be 
very simplistic. It is true that its accomplishments do not compare well with those of 
the previous two Czechoslovak exiles, both of which formed during a major world 
war. The situations of the two previous Czechoslovak exiles, however, were 
completely different. They took place during hostilities of world wars with defined 
lines of conflict and were relatively brief. Even so, the plans of the first two 
Czechoslovak exiles changed in accordance with the evolving plans of the major 
powers.  
 
In contrast, the post-1948 Czechoslovak exiles entered the Cold War struggle, in which 
the democratic powers felt compelled to observe democratic niceties and were aware 
that the Soviet yoke over Central Europe had been basically agreed to at Yalta. 
Professional diplomats showed little sympathy for Czechoslovak exiles and no real 
support, except for propaganda purposes. The often cited personal rivalries among 
exile politicians had deep historical roots. Despite their democratic declarations, 
politicians of the post-war National Front in Czechoslovakia had not permitted the 
reestablishment of pre-war civic parties in 1945 and remained silent when the leaders 
of civic parties were persecuted in various ways. Some National Front politicians had 
been hostile to wartime Slovak opponents of President Beneš. The personal conflicts 
were also a reflection of the politicians’ frustration with their new existences and the 
hopelessness of their cause, which was overshadowed by the interests of the major 
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powers. They were patriotic politicians who were powerless in their role in what, for 
them, represented a never-ending struggle. Their hopes for an early return to 
Czechoslovakia behind American tanks did not materialize. The outcome of the 
Hungarian revolt of 1956 taught the Czechoslovak exiles that the interests of major 
powers supersede those of small nations. The exiles would witness the Soviet 
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and those who survived had to wait until 1989 
for Communism to collapse, an event to which they contributed relatively little. 
Although their personalities are often the subject of criticism by journalists in today’s 
Czech Republic, Professor Igor Lukeš of Boston University concludes his essay on the 
first years of the Czechoslovak political exile as follows:  
 
 
Let us assume that the Czechoslovak exile group would have a Czech 
Roosevelt, Churchill, and DeGaulle and the rest would be composed of 
Masaryks. All of them would have been thrown into the reality of the 
divided world faced by the real leaders of the Council of Free 
Czechoslovakia. Would they have succeeded in overthrowing the 
totalitarian regime in Prague and restored democracy? I think not.59  
 
 
This author agrees with Lukeš’s conclusions. Despite their obvious shortcomings, the 
post-1948 Czechoslovak exiles could not have done much better. 
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